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@ARTICLE{Rther:1030868,
      author       = {Rüther, Markus},
      title        = {{W}hy {C}are {A}bout {S}ustainable {AI}? {S}ome {T}houghts
                      {F}rom {T}he {D}ebate on {M}eaning in {L}ife},
      journal      = {Philosophy $\&$ technology},
      volume       = {37},
      number       = {1},
      issn         = {2210-5433},
      address      = {Heidelberg]},
      publisher    = {Springer},
      reportid     = {FZJ-2024-05477},
      pages        = {37},
      year         = {2024},
      abstract     = {The focus of AI ethics has recently shifted towards the
                      question of whether and how the use of AI technologies can
                      promote sustainability. This new research question involves
                      discerning the sustainability of AI itself and evaluating AI
                      as a tool to achieve sustainable objectives. This article
                      aims to examine the justifications that one might employ to
                      advocate for promoting sustainable AI. Specifically, it
                      concentrates on a dimension of often disregarded reasons —
                      reasons of “meaning” or “meaningfulness” — as
                      discussed more recently in the “meaning in life”
                      literature of analytic ethics. To proceed, the article first
                      elucidates the working definitions of “sustainable AI”
                      and “meaning in life”, while also setting the criteria
                      for evaluating the plausibility of these reasons.
                      Subsequently, it presents and scrutinises three arguments
                      for the claim that one has reasons to care about sustainable
                      AI from a perspective of meaning: the
                      Meaning-conferring-action Argument, the Afterlife Argument,
                      and the Harm Argument. In conclusion, this article asserts
                      that only the Harm Argument presents a viable line of
                      reasoning. However, it also outlines the presuppositions of
                      this argument and the additional steps necessary to make it
                      compelling.},
      cin          = {INM-7},
      ddc          = {500},
      cid          = {I:(DE-Juel1)INM-7-20090406},
      pnm          = {5254 - Neuroscientific Data Analytics and AI (POF4-525) /
                      5255 - Neuroethics and Ethics of Information (POF4-525)},
      pid          = {G:(DE-HGF)POF4-5254 / G:(DE-HGF)POF4-5255},
      typ          = {PUB:(DE-HGF)16},
      doi          = {10.1007/s13347-024-00717-z},
      url          = {https://juser.fz-juelich.de/record/1030868},
}