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@ARTICLE{Zafar:1031282,
author = {Zafar, Mandy},
title = {{N}ormativity and {AI} moral agency},
journal = {AI and ethics},
volume = {5},
issn = {2730-5953},
address = {[Cham]},
publisher = {Springer},
reportid = {FZJ-2024-05644},
pages = {2605–2622},
year = {2025},
abstract = {The meanings of the concepts of moral agency in application
to AI technologies differ vastly from the ones we use for
humanagents. Minimal definitions of AI moral agency are
often connected with other normative agency-related
concepts, such asrationality or intelligence, autonomy, or
responsibility. This paper discusses the problematic
application of minimal conceptsof moral agency to AI. I
explore why any comprehensive account of AI moral agency has
to consider the interconnections toother normative
agency-related concepts and beware of four basic detrimental
mistakes in the current debate. The results ofthe analysis
are: (1) speaking about AI agency may lead to serious
demarcation problems and confusing assumptions aboutthe
abilities and prospects of AI technologies; (2) the talk of
AI moral agency is based on confusing assumptions and
turnsout to be senseless in the current prevalent versions.
As one possible solution, I propose to replace the concept
of AI agencywith the concept of AI automated performance
(AIAP).Keywords AI agency · AI moral agency · Artificial
moral agents · Philosophy of artificial intelligence},
cin = {INM-7},
ddc = {300},
cid = {I:(DE-Juel1)INM-7-20090406},
pnm = {5254 - Neuroscientific Data Analytics and AI (POF4-525) /
5255 - Neuroethics and Ethics of Information (POF4-525)},
pid = {G:(DE-HGF)POF4-5254 / G:(DE-HGF)POF4-5255},
typ = {PUB:(DE-HGF)16},
doi = {10.1007/s43681-024-00566-8},
url = {https://juser.fz-juelich.de/record/1031282},
}