001045990 001__ 1045990
001045990 005__ 20250918202258.0
001045990 0247_ $$2datacite_doi$$a10.34734/FZJ-2025-03648
001045990 037__ $$aFZJ-2025-03648
001045990 1001_ $$0P:(DE-Juel1)203213$$aYanikömer, Neslihan$$b0$$ufzj
001045990 1112_ $$aINMM 66th Annual Meeting$$cWashington, DC$$d2025-08-24 - 2025-08-28$$wUSA
001045990 245__ $$aSystems-Based Approach to Verification in Disarmament under the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
001045990 260__ $$c2025
001045990 300__ $$a1-4
001045990 3367_ $$2ORCID$$aCONFERENCE_PAPER
001045990 3367_ $$033$$2EndNote$$aConference Paper
001045990 3367_ $$2BibTeX$$aINPROCEEDINGS
001045990 3367_ $$2DRIVER$$aconferenceObject
001045990 3367_ $$2DataCite$$aOutput Types/Conference Paper
001045990 3367_ $$0PUB:(DE-HGF)8$$2PUB:(DE-HGF)$$aContribution to a conference proceedings$$bcontrib$$mcontrib$$s1758185091_27230
001045990 520__ $$aThe Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) offers nuclear-armed states two pathways for accession: disarm-and-join, where disarmament is completed before joining, and join-and-disarm, where disarmament occurs under a time-bound plan following accession. Although the join-and-disarm pathway enables immediate treaty adherence, it introduces significant challenges for verification, including ensuring irreversibility, safeguarding proliferation-sensitive information, and optimizing verification effectiveness. This study employs a systems-based approach to evaluate and compare this option in terms of verification strategies in different phases of disarmament process. Graph-theoretic modeling is utilized to map the network of potential rearmament routes, such as misuse of a reprocessing facility or diversion from dismantlement activities, whereas strategic game-theoretic analysis identifies optimal verification strategies and resource allocations to mitigate these risks. The comparative assessment highlights the conditions under which each pathway achieves maximum compliance credibility. By integrating a risk-based framework that prioritizes inspection resources toward the most attractive acquisition pathways, this research offers actionable insights for the design of robust verification protocols. These findings advance the objectives of the TPNW by enhancing the credibility and effectiveness of disarmament verification across diverse geopolitical contexts.
001045990 536__ $$0G:(DE-HGF)POF4-1412$$a1412 - Predisposal (POF4-141)$$cPOF4-141$$fPOF IV$$x0
001045990 536__ $$0G:(BMBF)01UG2210A$$aBMBF 01UG2210A - Verbundvorhaben: VeSPoTec - Zentrum für interdisziplinär-integrierte Verifikationsforschung. Teilvorhaben: Naturwissenschaftlich-interdisziplinäre Verifikation, Verifikationsregime und Umsetzungsstrategien für das Zentrum (01UG2210A)$$c01UG2210A$$x1
001045990 7001_ $$0P:(DE-Juel1)140251$$aNiemeyer, Irmgard$$b1$$ufzj
001045990 8564_ $$uhttps://juser.fz-juelich.de/record/1045990/files/yanikoemer_niemeyer_Systems-Based%20Approach%20to%20Verification%20in%20Disarmament%20under%20the%20TPNW.pdf$$yOpenAccess
001045990 909CO $$ooai:juser.fz-juelich.de:1045990$$popenaire$$popen_access$$pVDB$$pdriver$$pdnbdelivery
001045990 9101_ $$0I:(DE-588b)5008462-8$$6P:(DE-Juel1)203213$$aForschungszentrum Jülich$$b0$$kFZJ
001045990 9101_ $$0I:(DE-588b)5008462-8$$6P:(DE-Juel1)140251$$aForschungszentrum Jülich$$b1$$kFZJ
001045990 9131_ $$0G:(DE-HGF)POF4-141$$1G:(DE-HGF)POF4-140$$2G:(DE-HGF)POF4-100$$3G:(DE-HGF)POF4$$4G:(DE-HGF)POF$$9G:(DE-HGF)POF4-1412$$aDE-HGF$$bForschungsbereich Energie$$lNukleare Entsorgung, Sicherheit und Strahlenforschung (NUSAFE II)$$vNukleare Entsorgung$$x0
001045990 9141_ $$y2025
001045990 915__ $$0StatID:(DE-HGF)0510$$2StatID$$aOpenAccess
001045990 920__ $$lyes
001045990 9201_ $$0I:(DE-Juel1)IFN-2-20101013$$kIFN-2$$lNukleare Entsorgung$$x0
001045990 980__ $$acontrib
001045990 980__ $$aVDB
001045990 980__ $$aUNRESTRICTED
001045990 980__ $$aI:(DE-Juel1)IFN-2-20101013
001045990 9801_ $$aFullTexts