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@INPROCEEDINGS{Yanikmer:1045990,
      author       = {Yanikömer, Neslihan and Niemeyer, Irmgard},
      title        = {{S}ystems-{B}ased {A}pproach to {V}erification in
                      {D}isarmament under the {T}reaty on {P}rohibition of
                      {N}uclear {W}eapons},
      reportid     = {FZJ-2025-03648},
      pages        = {1-4},
      year         = {2025},
      abstract     = {The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)
                      offers nuclear-armed states two pathways for accession:
                      disarm-and-join, where disarmament is completed before
                      joining, and join-and-disarm, where disarmament occurs under
                      a time-bound plan following accession. Although the
                      join-and-disarm pathway enables immediate treaty adherence,
                      it introduces significant challenges for verification,
                      including ensuring irreversibility, safeguarding
                      proliferation-sensitive information, and optimizing
                      verification effectiveness. This study employs a
                      systems-based approach to evaluate and compare this option
                      in terms of verification strategies in different phases of
                      disarmament process. Graph-theoretic modeling is utilized to
                      map the network of potential rearmament routes, such as
                      misuse of a reprocessing facility or diversion from
                      dismantlement activities, whereas strategic game-theoretic
                      analysis identifies optimal verification strategies and
                      resource allocations to mitigate these risks. The
                      comparative assessment highlights the conditions under which
                      each pathway achieves maximum compliance credibility. By
                      integrating a risk-based framework that prioritizes
                      inspection resources toward the most attractive acquisition
                      pathways, this research offers actionable insights for the
                      design of robust verification protocols. These findings
                      advance the objectives of the TPNW by enhancing the
                      credibility and effectiveness of disarmament verification
                      across diverse geopolitical contexts.},
      month         = {Aug},
      date          = {2025-08-24},
      organization  = {INMM 66th Annual Meeting, Washington,
                       DC (USA), 24 Aug 2025 - 28 Aug 2025},
      cin          = {IFN-2},
      cid          = {I:(DE-Juel1)IFN-2-20101013},
      pnm          = {1412 - Predisposal (POF4-141) / BMBF 01UG2210A -
                      Verbundvorhaben: VeSPoTec - Zentrum für
                      interdisziplinär-integrierte Verifikationsforschung.
                      Teilvorhaben: Naturwissenschaftlich-interdisziplinäre
                      Verifikation, Verifikationsregime und Umsetzungsstrategien
                      für das Zentrum (01UG2210A)},
      pid          = {G:(DE-HGF)POF4-1412 / G:(BMBF)01UG2210A},
      typ          = {PUB:(DE-HGF)8},
      doi          = {10.34734/FZJ-2025-03648},
      url          = {https://juser.fz-juelich.de/record/1045990},
}