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@ARTICLE{Jefferson:151782,
      author       = {Jefferson, Anneli},
      title        = {{M}ental disorders, brain disorders and values},
      journal      = {Frontiers in psychology},
      volume       = {5},
      issn         = {1664-1078},
      address      = {Lausanne},
      publisher    = {Frontiers Research Foundation},
      reportid     = {FZJ-2014-01664},
      pages        = {130},
      year         = {2014},
      abstract     = {The debates about the normativity of mental disorders and
                      about the distinction between somatic and mental disorders
                      have long been closely linked. This is very obvious in
                      Szasz, who claims that there can only be brain disorders, no
                      mental disorders and that so-called mental disorders are
                      really problems in living. The implication of the latter
                      claim is that people who have mental disorders are really
                      people whose behavior and emotions depart from societal
                      expectations. One might therefore be tempted to think that
                      the normativity claim and the claim that mental disorders
                      are really brain disorders stand and fall together. This is
                      indeed what Stier claims. “Because of the normative nature
                      of psychiatry, mental disorders cannot be completely reduced
                      to neuronal or molecular processes.” (Stier, 2013, p.8)But
                      how close is the link between normativity and irreducibility
                      really? I agree with Stier that ascriptions of mental
                      disorders are intrinsically normative, and that what counts
                      as a mental disorder has to be decided at the mental rather
                      than at the brain level is also correct. However, the
                      normativity claim and the claim that physicalism does not
                      imply that all mental disorders are brain disorders can and
                      should be separated for two reasons: First, we do not need
                      the appeal to value judgments to justify the importance of
                      the mental level in description and explanation. Second, we
                      need to invest significant normative judgments in any kind
                      of ascription of disease or disorder, not just in the range
                      of the mental. ...},
      cin          = {INM-8},
      ddc          = {150},
      cid          = {I:(DE-Juel1)INM-8-20090406},
      pnm          = {472 - Key Technologies and Innovation Processes (POF2-472)},
      pid          = {G:(DE-HGF)POF2-472},
      typ          = {PUB:(DE-HGF)16},
      UT           = {WOS:000331286000001},
      pubmed       = {pmid:24596567},
      doi          = {10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00130},
      url          = {https://juser.fz-juelich.de/record/151782},
}