%0 Journal Article
%A Avenhaus, R.
%A Canty, M. J.
%T Playing for Time : A Sequential Inspection Game
%J European journal of operational research
%V 167
%@ 0377-2217
%C Amsterdam [u.a.]
%I Elsevier
%M PreJuSER-50492
%P 475 - 492
%D 2005
%Z Record converted from VDB: 12.11.2012
%X Inspections for timely detection of illegal activity on a finite, closed time interval and subject to first and second kind errors are modelled as a sequential, two-person game. The utilities of the players, inspector and inspectee, are assumed to be linear in the detection time with time-independent false alarm costs. Sets of Nash equilibria are obtained in which the inspectee behaves illegally or legally with probability one. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
%K J (WoSType)
%F PUB:(DE-HGF)16
%9 Journal Article
%U <Go to ISI:>//WOS:000230800500013
%R 10.1016/j.ejor.2004.01.045
%U https://juser.fz-juelich.de/record/50492