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000050492 1001_ $$0P:(DE-Juel1)VDB4991$$aAvenhaus, R.$$b0$$uFZJ
000050492 245__ $$aPlaying for Time : A Sequential Inspection Game
000050492 260__ $$aAmsterdam [u.a.]$$bElsevier$$c2005
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000050492 520__ $$aInspections for timely detection of illegal activity on a finite, closed time interval and subject to first and second kind errors are modelled as a sequential, two-person game. The utilities of the players, inspector and inspectee, are assumed to be linear in the detection time with time-independent false alarm costs. Sets of Nash equilibria are obtained in which the inspectee behaves illegally or legally with probability one. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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000050492 65320 $$2Author$$agame theory
000050492 65320 $$2Author$$amodelling
000050492 65320 $$2Author$$aoptimization
000050492 65320 $$2Author$$ainspections
000050492 7001_ $$0P:(DE-Juel1)VDB4989$$aCanty, M. J.$$b1$$uFZJ
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