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@ARTICLE{Heinrichs:905940,
author = {Heinrichs, Jan-Hendrik},
title = {{R}esponsibility assignment won’t solve the moral issues
of artificial intelligence},
journal = {AI and ethics},
volume = {},
issn = {2730-5961},
address = {[Cham]},
publisher = {Springer},
reportid = {FZJ-2022-01122},
pages = {},
year = {2022},
abstract = {Who is responsible for the events and consequences caused
by using artificially intelligent tools, and is there a gap
between what human agents can be responsible for and what is
being done using artificial intelligence? Both questions
presuppose that the term ‘responsibility’ is a good tool
for analysing the moral issues surrounding artificial
intelligence. This article will draw this presupposition
into doubt and show how reference to responsibility obscures
the complexity of moral situations and moral agency, which
can be analysed with a more differentiated toolset of moral
terminology. It suggests that the impression of
responsibility gaps only occurs if we gloss over the
complexity of the moral situation in which artificial
intelligent tools are employed and
if—counterfactually—we ascribe them some kind of
pseudo-agential status.},
cin = {INM-7},
ddc = {300},
cid = {I:(DE-Juel1)INM-7-20090406},
pnm = {5255 - Neuroethics and Ethics of Information (POF4-525)},
pid = {G:(DE-HGF)POF4-5255},
typ = {PUB:(DE-HGF)16},
doi = {10.1007/s43681-022-00133-z},
url = {https://juser.fz-juelich.de/record/905940},
}