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@ARTICLE{Knell:1006830,
      author       = {Knell, Sebastian and Rüther, Markus},
      title        = {{A}rtificial intelligence, superefficiency and the end of
                      work: a humanistic perspective on meaning in life},
      journal      = {AI and ethics},
      volume       = {4},
      issn         = {2730-5953},
      address      = {[Cham]},
      publisher    = {Springer},
      reportid     = {FZJ-2023-01874},
      pages        = {363},
      year         = {2023},
      abstract     = {How would it be assessed from an ethical point of view if
                      human wage work were replaced by artificially intelligent
                      systems (AI) in the course of an automation process? An
                      answer to this question has been discussed above all under
                      the aspects of individual well-being and social justice.
                      Although these perspectives are important, in this article,
                      we approach the question from a different perspective: that
                      of leading a meaningful life, as understood in analytical
                      ethics on the basis of the so-called meaning-in-life debate.
                      Our thesis here is that a life without wage work loses
                      specific sources of meaning, but can still be sufficiently
                      meaningful in certain other ways. Our starting point is John
                      Danaher’s claim that ubiquitous automation inevitably
                      leads to an achievement gap. Although we share this
                      diagnosis, we reject his provocative solution according to
                      which game-like virtual realities could be an adequate
                      substitute source of meaning. Subsequently, we outline our
                      own systematic alternative which we regard as a decidedly
                      humanistic perspective. It focuses both on different kinds
                      of social work and on rather passive forms of being related
                      to meaningful contents. Finally, we go into the limits and
                      unresolved points of our argumentation as part of an
                      outlook, but we also try to defend its fundamental
                      persuasiveness against a potential objection.},
      cin          = {INM-7},
      ddc          = {300},
      cid          = {I:(DE-Juel1)INM-7-20090406},
      pnm          = {5255 - Neuroethics and Ethics of Information (POF4-525)},
      pid          = {G:(DE-HGF)POF4-5255},
      typ          = {PUB:(DE-HGF)16},
      doi          = {10.1007/s43681-023-00273-w},
      url          = {https://juser.fz-juelich.de/record/1006830},
}