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| Home > Publications database > Artificial intelligence, superefficiency and the end of work: a humanistic perspective on meaning in life |
| Home > Publications database > Artificial intelligence, superefficiency and the end of work: a humanistic perspective on meaning in life |
| Journal Article | FZJ-2023-01874 |
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2023
Springer
[Cham]
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Please use a persistent id in citations: doi:10.1007/s43681-023-00273-w doi:10.34734/FZJ-2023-01874
Abstract: How would it be assessed from an ethical point of view if human wage work were replaced by artificially intelligent systems (AI) in the course of an automation process? An answer to this question has been discussed above all under the aspects of individual well-being and social justice. Although these perspectives are important, in this article, we approach the question from a different perspective: that of leading a meaningful life, as understood in analytical ethics on the basis of the so-called meaning-in-life debate. Our thesis here is that a life without wage work loses specific sources of meaning, but can still be sufficiently meaningful in certain other ways. Our starting point is John Danaher’s claim that ubiquitous automation inevitably leads to an achievement gap. Although we share this diagnosis, we reject his provocative solution according to which game-like virtual realities could be an adequate substitute source of meaning. Subsequently, we outline our own systematic alternative which we regard as a decidedly humanistic perspective. It focuses both on different kinds of social work and on rather passive forms of being related to meaningful contents. Finally, we go into the limits and unresolved points of our argumentation as part of an outlook, but we also try to defend its fundamental persuasiveness against a potential objection.
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; DEAL Springer
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