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| Journal Article | PreJuSER-50492 |
;
2005
Elsevier
Amsterdam [u.a.]
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Please use a persistent id in citations: doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2004.01.045
Abstract: Inspections for timely detection of illegal activity on a finite, closed time interval and subject to first and second kind errors are modelled as a sequential, two-person game. The utilities of the players, inspector and inspectee, are assumed to be linear in the detection time with time-independent false alarm costs. Sets of Nash equilibria are obtained in which the inspectee behaves illegally or legally with probability one. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keyword(s): J ; game theory (auto) ; modelling (auto) ; optimization (auto) ; inspections (auto)
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