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| Home > Publications database > Game Theoretical Models for Arms Control and Disarmament Verification |
| Home > Publications database > Game Theoretical Models for Arms Control and Disarmament Verification |
| Contribution to a book | FZJ-2021-00452 |
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2020
Springer International Publishing
Cham
ISBN: 978-3-030-29537-0
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Abstract: In the context of arms control and disarmament, inspections are procedures designed to provide data with which a State’s compliance or non-compliance to a treaty, an agreement or other set of rules can be assessed. There is always, potentially at least, a conflict between the inspection authority (in the following Inspectorate) and the State (in the following Inspectee) who is required to comply,but who may have an interest not to do so. Non-cooperative game theory provides the appropriate tools to analyse these kind of conflicts. The solution concept is hereby the so-called Nash equilibrium. Since inspections, beyond their assessment of compliance or non-compliance, should induce the State to legal behaviour, one may say that effective inspections should be designed such that the Inspectee’s equilibrium strategy of the game theoretical model describing these inspections is legal behaviour of the Inspectee. Game theoretical analyses of arms control and disarmament verification have been performed since the early sixties of the last century. It was, however, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which stimulated more detailed analytical work. During the last 10 years two kinds of topics have been addressed in greater detail, unannounced interim inspections and acquisition path analysis. In this paper, assumptions necessary for a quantitative modelling of unannounced interim inspections are discussed, and one example is presented in major detail. Some thoughts on the art of modelling conflicts of both technical and political nature complement the previous thoughts.
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