%0 Journal Article
%A Avenhaus
%A Krieger, Thomas
%A Canty
%T Effort Bounded Inspections
%J ESARDA BULLETIN
%V 64
%M FZJ-2023-00428
%P 39-47
%D 2022
%X Given an Inspectorate with the task of verifying the adherence of an Operator of a group of facilities to an agreement on permitted activities within those facilities, how large should the inspection effort be and how should it be distributed among the facilities? A game-theoretical approach is described which addresses these important questions, generalizing and extending the applicability of earlier inspection models, which either treated inspection effort as extrinsic, or which imposed special assumptions. A solution of the inspection game, i.e., a Nash equilibrium, is presented in quite general terms, and two applications are presented.
%F PUB:(DE-HGF)16
%9 Journal Article
%R 10.3011/ESARDA.IJNSNP.2022.4
%U https://juser.fz-juelich.de/record/917196