Journal Article

FZJ-2023-00428

http://join2-wiki.gsi.de/foswiki/pub/Main/Artwork/join2_logo100x88.png Effort Bounded Inspections

Avenhaus ; Krieger, T. (Corresponding author)FZJ* ; Canty

2022

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Please use a persistent id in citations: doi:10.3011/ESARDA.IJNSNP.2022.4

Abstract: Given an Inspectorate with the task of verifying the adherence of an Operator of a group of facilities to an agreement on permitted activities within those facilities, how large should the inspection effort be and how should it be distributed among the facilities? A game-theoretical approach is described which addresses these important questions, generalizing and extending the applicability of earlier inspection models, which either treated inspection effort as extrinsic, or which imposed special assumptions. A solution of the inspection game, i.e., a Nash equilibrium, is presented in quite general terms, and two applications are presented.

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Contributing Institute(s):

1. Nukleare Entsorgung (IEK-6)

Research Program(s):

1. 1411 - Nuclear Waste Disposal (POF4-141) (POF4-141)
2. IAEA GER SP - Joint Programme on the Technical Development and Further Improvement of IAEA Safeguards between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA-19781005) (IAEA-19781005)

Appears in the scientific report 2022

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