TY  - JOUR
AU  - Avenhaus
AU  - Krieger, Thomas
AU  - Canty
TI  - Effort Bounded Inspections
JO  - ESARDA BULLETIN
VL  - 64
M1  - FZJ-2023-00428
SP  - 39-47
PY  - 2022
AB  - Given an Inspectorate with the task of verifying the adherence of an Operator of a group of facilities to an agreement on permitted activities within those facilities, how large should the inspection effort be and how should it be distributed among the facilities? A game-theoretical approach is described which addresses these important questions, generalizing and extending the applicability of earlier inspection models, which either treated inspection effort as extrinsic, or which imposed special assumptions. A solution of the inspection game, i.e., a Nash equilibrium, is presented in quite general terms, and two applications are presented.
LB  - PUB:(DE-HGF)16
DO  - DOI:10.3011/ESARDA.IJNSNP.2022.4
UR  - https://juser.fz-juelich.de/record/917196
ER  -