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@ARTICLE{Avenhaus:917196,
author = {Avenhaus and Krieger, Thomas and Canty},
title = {{E}ffort {B}ounded {I}nspections},
journal = {ESARDA BULLETIN},
volume = {64},
reportid = {FZJ-2023-00428},
pages = {39-47},
year = {2022},
abstract = {Given an Inspectorate with the task of verifying the
adherence of an Operator of a group of facilities to an
agreement on permitted activities within those facilities,
how large should the inspection effort be and how should it
be distributed among the facilities? A game-theoretical
approach is described which addresses these important
questions, generalizing and extending the applicability of
earlier inspection models, which either treated inspection
effort as extrinsic, or which imposed special assumptions. A
solution of the inspection game, i.e., a Nash equilibrium,
is presented in quite general terms, and two applications
are presented.},
cin = {IEK-6},
cid = {I:(DE-Juel1)IEK-6-20101013},
pnm = {1411 - Nuclear Waste Disposal (POF4-141) / IAEA GER SP -
Joint Programme on the Technical Development and Further
Improvement of IAEA Safeguards between the Government of the
Federal Republic of Germany and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA-19781005)},
pid = {G:(DE-HGF)POF4-1411 / G:(DE-Juel1)IAEA-19781005},
typ = {PUB:(DE-HGF)16},
doi = {10.3011/ESARDA.IJNSNP.2022.4},
url = {https://juser.fz-juelich.de/record/917196},
}