Journal Article

FZJ-2023-02148

http://join2-wiki.gsi.de/foswiki/pub/Main/Artwork/join2_logo100x88.png Coordination and cooperation in asymmetric commons dilemmas: A replication study

Jarke-Neuert, J. (Corresponding author)FZJ*

2023
Springer Heidelberg [u.a.]

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Please use a persistent id in citations: http://hdl.handle.net/2128/34502  doi:10.1007/s40881-023-00131-9

Abstract: Janssen et al. (Exp Econ 14:547–566, 2014) studied an asymmetric, finitely repeated common-pool resource dilemma with free-form communication in which subjects made decisions about investments in an infrastructure, and about extraction from a resource made available by this infrastructure. They found that infrastructure provision and joint payoffs converged to high levels because structurally advantaged head-enders tend to behave fairly by restricting themselves voluntarily at the extraction stage, and structurally disadvantaged “tail-enders” reciprocate by investing. This paper reports a fully independent, pre-registered, double-blind replication attempt conducted in a different lab, that also supplies elevated statistical power and adheres to the highest principles of scientific transparency and openness. We find that the key results of Janssen et al. not only re-appear qualitatively but are quantitatively and statistically strengthened. The conclusions drawn from the results are therefore robust, and the basic design can be confidently used for follow-up research.

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Contributing Institute(s):

1. Systemforschung und Technologische Entwicklung (IEK-STE)

Research Program(s):

1. 1112 - Societally Feasible Transformation Pathways (POF4-111) (POF4-111)
2. DFG project 390683824 - EXC 2037: Climate, Climatic Change, and Society (CLICCS) (390683824) (390683824)

Appears in the scientific report 2023

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Database coverage:
; ; Clarivate Analytics Master Journal List ; DEAL Springer ; Emerging Sources Citation Index ; IF < 5 ; JCR ; Web of Science Core Collection

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