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| Hauptseite > Publikationsdatenbank > Systems-Based Approach to Verification in Disarmament under the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons |
| Contribution to a conference proceedings | FZJ-2025-03648 |
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2025
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Please use a persistent id in citations: doi:10.34734/FZJ-2025-03648
Abstract: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) offers nuclear-armed states two pathways for accession: disarm-and-join, where disarmament is completed before joining, and join-and-disarm, where disarmament occurs under a time-bound plan following accession. Although the join-and-disarm pathway enables immediate treaty adherence, it introduces significant challenges for verification, including ensuring irreversibility, safeguarding proliferation-sensitive information, and optimizing verification effectiveness. This study employs a systems-based approach to evaluate and compare this option in terms of verification strategies in different phases of disarmament process. Graph-theoretic modeling is utilized to map the network of potential rearmament routes, such as misuse of a reprocessing facility or diversion from dismantlement activities, whereas strategic game-theoretic analysis identifies optimal verification strategies and resource allocations to mitigate these risks. The comparative assessment highlights the conditions under which each pathway achieves maximum compliance credibility. By integrating a risk-based framework that prioritizes inspection resources toward the most attractive acquisition pathways, this research offers actionable insights for the design of robust verification protocols. These findings advance the objectives of the TPNW by enhancing the credibility and effectiveness of disarmament verification across diverse geopolitical contexts.
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