Meaning in Life in AI Ethics—Some Trends and Perspectives

Nyholm, Sven; Rüther, Markus

doi:10.1007/s13347-023-00620-z

Journal Article

FZJ-2023-01875

Meaning in Life in AI Ethics—Some Trends and Perspectives

Nyholm, S. ; Rüther, M. (Corresponding author)FZJ*

2023
Springer Heidelberg]

Philosophy & technology 36(2), 20 (2023) [10.1007/s13347-023-00620-z]

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Please use a persistent id in citations: http://hdl.handle.net/2128/34335 doi:10.1007/s13347-023-00620-z

Abstract: In this paper, we discuss the relation between recent philosophical discussions about meaning in life (from authors like Susan Wolf, Thaddeus Metz, and others) and the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI). Our goal is twofold, namely, to argue that considering the axiological category of meaningfulness can enrich AI ethics, on the one hand, and to portray and evaluate the small, but growing literature that already exists on the relation between meaning in life and AI ethics, on the other hand. We start out our review by clarifying the basic assumptions of the meaning in life discourse and how it understands the term ‘meaningfulness’. After that, we offer five general arguments for relating philosophical questions about meaning in life to questions about the role of AI in human life. For example, we formulate a worry about a possible meaningfulness gap related to AI on analogy with the idea of responsibility gaps created by AI, a prominent topic within the AI ethics literature. We then consider three specific types of contributions that have been made in the AI ethics literature so far: contributions related to self-development, the future of work, and relationships. As we discuss those three topics, we highlight what has already been done, but we also point out gaps in the existing literature. We end with an outlook regarding where we think the discussion of this topic should go next.

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